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epistemological injustice in global justice theory and
practice
Erin K. Wilson
Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, Centre for Religion, Conflict and the Public Domain,
University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article explores the potential implications for the pursuit of global justice if
certain non-secular ways of thinking, being in and responding to the world are
devalued, marginalized and excluded by dominant secular norms that presently
guide global justice theory and practice. I argue that pervasive assumptions
about the nature of religion and the role that it should (or should not) play in
public life undermine existing approaches to the pursuit of global justice in
theory and practice. Specifically, I suggest that this dominance of secular
assumptions constitutes a form of epistemological injustice that contributes to
undermining efforts to address material injustices. I explore these issues
through an examination of research and practice on global justice, utilizing
specific examples from human rights, humanitarian aid and development, and
forced migration. I conclude by considering some possible alternatives to
dominant secular frames, though argue that these is still in need of further
research and development to offer a useful alternative.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 17 August 2015; Accepted 16 May 2017
KEYWORDS Religion; secularism; global justice; epistemological injustice; human rights;
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1. Introduction
During a fieldwork visit to Malawi and South Africa in 2014, a colleague
and I were conducting interviews with a variety of community leaders and
members on the importance of religious beliefs, actors and organizations
in developing responses to issues of gender inequality and gender-based
violence in developing communities. These interviews ranged from
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women involved with local church organizations, political leaders, faith
leaders, traditional chiefs and elders to leaders of children’s activity
groups, local charities and support organizations. One such interview
was done with a police officer in a small community in KwaZulu Natal,
approximately two hours’ drive south-west of Durban. We entered the
local police station and wandered around for a while, knocking on
doors, trying to find the police officer who had agreed to be interviewed.
After waiting for a while and beginning to wonder whether there had been
some kind of mix-up, a door opened and a woman looked out. ‘Hello, did
you knock? I’m so sorry; I was having my moment of prayer. Do come
in.’1 We entered her small office and she told us that she was the
Warrant Officer whom we were to interview. She offered us a seat,
whilst arranging her desk. As we were waiting for her to be ready, we
noticed a laptop on a shelf nearby playing a video with a pastor giving a
sermon and a document about spiritual warfare pinned on the wall
behind her.
We began by asking her some questions about the most significant
crimes in the area, which she told us are assault and rape, most frequently
of women. We then asked about the specific challenges that exist in the
community around addressing these crimes and what she thinks are the
most appropriate and effective ways to approach them. We then moved
to the specific topic of religion – what role, if any, do or should religious
leaders, institutions and organizations in the community play in addres-
sing these problems? Is it important that they are involved? We were
slightly taken aback by her response:
Definitely it is important. I believe pastors need to be informed because they
will intervene with prayer. I believe we cannot fight crime without the involve-
ment of the power of God. In prayer, my God tells me that there is nothing that
we cannot do. It is very important; it is the first of all things that need to be
engaged in by pastors.
From our background reading and research, we had frequently encoun-
tered the argument that religious leaders and organizations should be
involved in addressing global justice issues such as gender inequality,
human rights abuses, poverty and violence, because they are highly inﬂu-
ential in their communities and often set an example for others to follow
(Johnston and Sampson 1994; Appleby 2000; Barnet and Stein 2012).
This, however, was the ﬁrst time we had heard a public ofﬁcial argue,
1Names have been withheld to protect privacy.
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on the record, that religious leaders should be involved because of the
importance of the spiritual realm in addressing these social and political
issues.
I recount this story, not because it indicates the significance of religion
in global justice issues such as gender inequality and violence on the
ground, but rather because of the questions it raised for us as researchers.
These questions concern the different ways issues of injustice are concep-
tualized and approached in the contemporary globalized context,
especially with regard to the place of religion. We – two white, Western
academics – did not expect that a police officer, a public figure and repre-
sentative of the state, would openly and unabashedly discuss spirituality as
a legitimate, even fundamental, primary response to problems of gender
inequality and gender-based violence in the community. Such public
expressions of religiosity are at odds with conceptions of the public
domain and the responsibilities of actors representing the state and
acting in the public domain that dominate political philosophy, sociology
and International Relations approaches (Wilson 2012; Bartelink and
Wilson 2014). They are also at odds with the worldviews and assumptions
that dominate the foreign policy of European states that frequently finance
projects aimed to combat global justice issues such as gender inequality.
According to these perspectives, state actors should, as far as possible,
be ‘neutral’ in their opinions, particularly when it comes to religion, and
should be guided by ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’. Indeed, neutrality, reason
and rationality are fundamental components of how Euro-American
scholars and policy-makers understand fairness, equality and justice
(Rawls 1988; Sen 2010) and how issues of global injustice are approached
in policy and practice, particularly in the humanitarian aid and develop-
ment sector (Ager and Ager 2011: 459, 461; Lynch 2011; Barnet and Stein
2012: 25).
Secularism has been and continues to be widely viewed as providing the
guarantee for this neutrality as a guiding framework for policy delibera-
tions in the public sphere (Casanova 1994, 2011; Ager and Ager 2011:
458–9). This is why public reason, as articulated by John Rawls, is a hall-
mark of much contemporary global justice theorizing (Sen 2010) and why
emancipatory global justice movements, such as the World Social Forum
(WSF), promote secularism and public reason as critical to the pursuit of
global justice (Conway 2013).
Religion has largely been described as the antithesis of reason and
rationality in literature on public justice, including global justice (Sen
2010; Wilson 2010, 2012; Ager and Ager 2011: 461). Yet, as numerous
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 531
scholars have highlighted, secularism is not always as neutral as is claimed.
What is deemed as universally ‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’ according to a
secular worldview is arguably partial and culturally specific (Eberle
2002: 313–4; Hurd 2008; Bretherton 2010a: 15). Indeed, certain forms
of secularism can actively devalue, marginalize and exclude worldviews
that do not adhere to secular norms and standards (Mavelli and Petito
2012: 931).
Building on these dilemmas, the central question I explore in this article
is: What are the implications for the pursuit of global justice if certain non-
secular ways of thinking, being in and responding to the world – ways of
thinking and being that arguably characterize vast sections of the global
population most directly affected by issues of global injustice2 – are deva-
lued, marginalized and excluded by dominant secular assumptions that
presently guide global justice theory and practice? This question is rel-
evant not only for the communities where non-secular views prevail,
but also for so-called secular countries, such as those within Europe,
who frequently provide the funding and personnel for projects that
respond to issues of global injustice. I argue that certain pervasive
secular norms about the nature of religion and the role that it should
(or should not) play in public life, undermine existing approaches to
global justice. Specifically, I suggest that the dominance of secular assump-
tions across global justice theory and practice constitutes a form of epis-
temological injustice – what De Sousa Santos (2005: xviii; see also
Bennett 2007) has more violently described as ‘epistemicide’ – that con-
tributes to undermining efforts to address material injustices. These domi-
nant assumptions posit secular – understood as rational, material,
physical, scientific, immanent, universal and predominantly Euro-Amer-
ican – perspectives, worldviews and actors as implicitly superior to reli-
gious – understood as spiritual, metaphysical, cosmological,
transcendent, emotional, particular and predominantly non-Euro-Amer-
ican – perspectives, worldviews and actors. I further suggest that the very
categories we presently use to make sense of religion and public life – reli-
gious, secular, public, private – in themselves construct hierarchies of
knowledge and experience that lead to certain voices and perspectives
2The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2012: 9) reported that 84% of the world’s population ident-
ified as ‘religiously affiliated’. The majority of these religiously affiliated people live outside the highly
developed, prosperous, powerful – and largely secular – countries of Europe and North America
(Pew Forum 2012: 10), and are daily affected by poverty, economic inequality, human rights abuses, con-
flict, violence, food insecurity and environmental degradation.
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being privileged and others being excluded (Prokhovnik 2003; Wilson
2012).
This is not to suggest that secularism is the primary source of such
exclusion and marginalization. Other issues are undoubtedly at play,
such as racism, classism, neoliberalism and the historical legacy of coloni-
alism (George 2004; De Sousa Santos 2005; Sen 2010; Conway 2013).
Nonetheless, secularism is a contributing factor, yet one whose impact
on global justice has to date been undertheorized. Indeed, the ways in
which secularism intersects with these other forms of exclusion and the
extent to which secular frameworks may provide conceptual and ideologi-
cal support for colonialism, classism, neoliberalism and racism have only
recently begun to be explored in greater depth (Asad 2003; Beaumont and
Cloke 2010: 5; Bretherton 2010b: 214; Cloke 2010: 229; Lloyd and Vief-
hues-Bailey 2015).
In this article, I deal with several problems and challenges, specifically
related to assumptions of secularism and how they affect efforts to pursue
global justice. To begin, I outline some of the recent dynamics that have
contributed to raising questions about the suitability of secularism to
provide the most effective political framework for realizing equality and
justice. From there, I discuss the main trends in research and practice
on global justice and how secular assumptions are embedded here
before discussing some examples of the problems I am raising with refer-
ence to human rights, humanitarian aid and development, and forced
migration, three key areas of policy and practice where global justice is
pursued. In closing, I briefly consider post-secularism, which has been
posited as a potential alternative to secular approaches to enable the
inclusion of presently excluded voices and perspectives, encouraging
greater understanding, collaboration and cooperation, and moving
towards conditions that facilitate greater equality and justice.
2. Secularism
Secular approaches to public life are arguably bound up with questions of
justice and equality. In democratic societies that are highly diverse and
plural regarding both immanent and transcendent worldviews, secularism
in its various guises attempts to manage relationships between these com-
peting worldviews in order to provide the best circumstances for the
pursuit of the common good (Ager and Ager 2011: 458). In its original
nineteenth-century incarnation, secularism was not hostile to religion,
but rather protective towards it, offering a means through which believers
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could be given sufficient freedom to resolve moral questions according to
their own conscience, without unnecessary interference from the state
(Asad 2003: 23–4; Kmiec 2015: 41). Much has changed since then, with
regard to religion, secularism and society as a whole. New challenges
have emerged that highlight the vulnerabilities and shortcomings of secu-
larism, alongside its potential to also marginalize and exclude people,
raising questions regarding its utility in its current dominant form.
The first challenge that has raised questions about secularism is the rec-
ognition of its ideological character (Casanova 1994, 2011; Kuru 2007;
Hurd 2008). Within sociology of religion, political philosophy, religious
studies and International Relations, scholars now widely recognize that
secularism is not the neutral, universal arbiter of reason and political
deliberation that it is often claimed to be (Eberle 2002; Mavelli 2012;
Wilson 2012). Rather, it is a highly specific, culturally embedded model
for managing the relationship between religion and politics, albeit one
that has now become influential across many diverse regions of the
world (Gutkowski 2014: 6).
The recognition of these dimensions leads to a further realization that
certain forms of secularism are not just about the judicial and political
arrangements for managing religion’s relationship with politics, but are
underpinned by an ideological agenda that makes assumptions about
the worth of religious belief and practice in relation to other human pur-
suits, about the existence and value of immanent and transcendent realms,
about the very nature of religion itself (Hurd 2008). Such assumptions
include the idea that religion is a distinct and separate field of human
activity that can be separated out from politics, economics and culture
(Asad 2002: 116); that there are public and private domains that can be
separated from one another (Taylor 2009); that religion is a private indi-
vidual and largely irrational activity, best confined to the private sphere;
that religions are primarily organized socially via institutions (Wilson
2012). These assumptions impact the way in which some states, especially
Euro-American states, behave in world politics. They shape how states
engage with religious actors. They influence how Euro-American states
in particular interact with other states where religion is more central
than it is in Euro-American secular worldviews. Finally, these assumptions
about religion shape how states carry out their policies. In addition, these
assumptions underpin global governance structures and frameworks
aimed at addressing issues of injustice, including human rights violations,
aid and development, displacement and protection, climate change, con-
flict resolution and peacebuilding, amongst a host of others (Gutkowski
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2014: 6). Secular assumptions are deeply embedded within these global
governance frameworks and are internalized and reproduced by actors
that self-identify as religious and as secular alike (Lynch 2011; Barnet
and Stein 2012). It is only now that scholars are beginning to explore
how secularism as an ideology has affected a variety of different areas of
global politics and re-examine assumptions about religion’s role in
global civil society and about religion itself.
The second challenge that has contributed to undermining secularism
is the impact of globalization, and particularly neoliberal globalization, on
the nature and reach of both secularism and the position of the nation-
state in global politics. As Peter Beyer (2013: 664) has argued, ‘the
default unit of analysis or observation is no longer the local, regional,
national and in most instances western society, but rather global society
as a whole’. Globalization contributes to increasing interconnections
across state borders and the emergence of multiple public spheres that
overlap and intersect at various different levels of global civil society
(Fraser 2006). These multifarious and overlapping public spheres necess-
arily affect the nature of secularism, since secularism is both constituted by
and constitutive of the public/private divide (Taylor 2009: 1149; Wilson
2012: 49–51). In this context, secularism cannot be seen only as a form
of statecraft, but must also be considered as a normative framework
that shapes human activity across different contexts.
An additional impact has been the rise of neoliberalism as the domi-
nant ideology governing state and inter-state economics. The relationship
between neoliberal and secular assumptions has to date rarely been
explored in depth. Their mutual foregrounding of rationalism and the
material world, however, suggest that exploring this relationship may be
a fruitful avenue of enquiry for expanding our understanding of both neo-
liberalism and secularism and their public socio-political dynamics
(During 2010; Mueller 2011: 379, 383). As neoliberalism has gained
increasing power at the national and international levels, alternative
forms of globalization have emerged such as grassroots resistance to the
inequalities and injustices brought about by neoliberal globalization. Pre-
vailing forms of analysis of these dynamics have undervalued the role of
religious actors and worldviews, affected by secular assumptions
(Conway 2013: 156). Indeed, there has been a dominant attitude that reli-
gion is incompatible with resistance movements, since these are associated
with progressive politics, and religion is often assumed to be highly con-
servative (Conway 2013). Such assumptions are misleading, as the
plethora of religious organizations engaged with progressive social
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justice issues and movements attests (Beaumont and Cloke 2010; Wilson
2010; Wilson and Steger 2013). Religion cannot easily be classified as
either an obstacle or a conduit for the pursuit of justice and social trans-
formation, since it is frequently entangled with both (Wilson and Steger
2013). Such efforts at classification are also potentially futile, since it is
not religions that have agency to obstruct or promote justice, but
people. Thus, it may be more constructive to move away from such categ-
orization attempts and instead seek to engage, deeply and continually,
with ‘religion’ and all its various actors and dimensions in contextually
sensitive ways.
3. Global injustice and spiritual justice
Questions of global justice have taken on increasing significance in the
twenty-first century, with greater interconnection between and across
states and new issues of injustice being identified as a result of increasing
global consciousness and the expansion of the public sphere beyond the
borders of the state (Tarrow 2005; Fraser 2006; Steger 2008). Within
scholarly literature, global justice is frequently addressed from two dis-
tinct but interrelated angles. The first is predominantly philosophical,
while the second focuses more on issues and social movements.
Within the philosophical literature, scholars of global justice and its
related terms of international and transnational justice explore the
theoretical and ethical arguments and justifications for who bears
primary responsibility for inequalities and injustices and what actions
should be taken to address these (Beitz 2010; O’Neill 2010; Caney
2011). These writings often privilege the state and the individual as
the primary units of analysis (Singer 2010), with some consideration
of intergovernmental agencies (Pogge 2010). A key area of contestation
in the theoretical literature is that between communitarians and cosmo-
politans, whether questions of justice should extend beyond the bound-
aries of communities, such as states, or whether they need to take into
consideration humanity as a whole (Wilson 2014). Yet, this literature
also questions whether such a universal approach is possible given the
myriad cultural, ethical, philosophical, political, ideological and religious
worldviews that color how such issues are addressed across the globe
(Wilson 2010). A key characteristic of this literature is its emphasis on
secular public reason and rationality as the most appropriate framework
through which questions of global justice should be debated and decided
(Rawls 1988; Sen 2010).
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Conversely, literature focused on global justice from an issues and
social movement-driven perspective, whilst still focusing on states, is
also interested in the responsibilities carried by transnational actors,
such as corporations, and intergovernmental agencies, such as the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations and so
forth, as well as emphasizing the importance of grassroots community
perspectives on issues of global justice. This literature often comes from
scholar-activists writing from within the global justice movement itself
(Bello 1999; George 2004; Tarrow 2005; Conway 2013). This body of
literature has also encouraged consideration of questions of historical,
inter-generational, cultural and climate (in)justice alongside judicial, phi-
losophical and moral approaches (Steger et al. 2013). As Conway (2013)
has noted, these movements are frequently embedded in the progressive
emancipatory political ideologies of modernity, such as Marxism, social-
ism and feminism, all of which are highly secular and often anti-religious.
Both the philosophical and social movement approaches have some-
thing to offer in terms of the questions they raise, the issues they focus
on and the actors they analyze. In the contemporary globalized, highly
interconnected context, it is becoming increasingly necessary to take
into consideration social, political, economic, cultural and historical
dynamics across local, national, regional, transnational, international
and global levels. This requires the adoption of broader, multi-scalar
notions of justice. These should not be understood as a hierarchy of
scales, separate and distinct from each other, as Saskia Sassen (2003: 7)
has pointed out, but as embedded in and entangled with one another. It
also suggests that cosmopolitan approaches may be more suited to the
contemporary globalized setting than communitarian approaches. I
have elsewhere engaged with some of the ethical and philosophical ques-
tions around global justice and suggested that it is necessary to retain a
fluid sense of what justice is, a continual process, constantly being
refined, not an end-point (Wilson 2010). Approaches to global justice
must contain both universal and specific, particular dimensions, consist-
ent with Sassen’s multi-scalar analysis. It cannot simply focus on the indi-
vidual or the state, but must be concerned with both individuals and
communities (and not just nation-states, but families, local villages,
regions and transnational communities) and all of these actors must be
both subjects and agents of justice processes. Finally, concepts and prac-
tices of justice must be developed through critical reflection on both
theory and experience (Wilson 2010).
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The philosophical and social movement approaches share a primary
concern with questions of global economic inequality and human rights
abuses, what might be described as material and immanent injustices.
There is far less discussion of epistemological issues of injustice in
either approach. The scholarly literature feeds into and interacts with a
number of different areas of activity in relation to policy and practice.
This includes humanitarian aid and development work, where issues of
economic inequality and human rights abuses are a central focus, global
economic and trade policies, as well as protest and resistance movements,
such as the WSF. They also share an implicit embedded privileging of
secular assumptions and worldviews, which arguably marginalizes
alternative non-secular perspectives (Wilson 2010; Conway 2013).3
This predominance of secular assumptions is evident in the emphasis
on reason and rationality, but also in the very issues that global justice the-
orists and activists focus on, mainly immanent questions of material, pol-
itical and juridical inequality. Yet, these are not the only issues of
inequality and injustice that communities around the world consider
pressing, since it excludes consideration of transcendental justice.
Where actors operating from within a religious or cosmological worldview
are concerned, I suggest it is also necessary to acknowledge the claims to
justice for what I shall call spiritual injustices. Spiritual injustices violate
what a religious group perceives should be the established or desired
cosmic order or natural reality. There are obviously degrees of scale in
this. Some religious actors will hold understandings of reality that are rela-
tively easy to reconcile with religious actors from different belief systems
or with secular actors – the Parliament of the World’s Religions provides
an example of this – participants in the Parliament desire a more just,
equitable and peaceful world, but do so for different reasons (Parliament
of theWorld’s Religions 2006). These different justifications create tension
3It is important to clarify my critique of the WSF here. I am not suggesting that the WSF is only a secularist
space. Numerous religious actors and organizations participate in WSF activities and actions, and indeed
there have been special sessions at previous WSFs exploring the role of religion in social and political
transformation (my thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this). However, the emphasis
that religion is something separate and distinct from the secular is part and parcel of a secularist per-
spective (Asad 2003). Non-secular worldviews do not divide the world up according to categories of ‘reli-
gion’ and ‘secular’. Further, the fact that there have been special sessions that specifically address the
role of religion in social and political transformation suggests that there is a prior assumption that reli-
gion does not contribute to these things, or at least that there is a question mark about whether religion
does contribute or not. By contrast, as far as I have been able to determine there has been no special
session on the role of secularism in social and political transformation, for example, precisely because
secularism is automatically assumed to contribute to these things, or to simply be the neutral space
in which contestation over social and political transformation occurs. These are examples of what I
am referring to when I suggest that secular worldviews are privileged in WSF spaces.
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and debate but are not impossible to overcome (Brink 2003: 17). Others
will be vastly, perhaps irreconcilably, different. ISIS, Al-Qaeda, the
Army of God and a number of other what might be labeled fundamentalist
or radicalized4 groups provide examples here. A significant part of the
problem of global justice, then, is reconciling the multiple worldviews
and competing or contradictory understandings of shared concepts. As
noted above, while secular approaches endeavor to provide this shared
language for addressing questions of immanent injustice, there is at
present little space for worldviews and analyses that take seriously spiritual
injustices, or spiritual responses to material injustices, such as that of the
policewoman in the encounter I shared at the beginning of this article.
This may compound existing forms of marginalization and exclusion,
arising from the influence of racism, sexism, colonialism and neoliberal-
ism, or may generate new forms of marginalization and exclusion. In a
globalized context where most individuals and communities operate
from within worldviews where the spiritual and the transcendental are
critical, the exclusion of such approaches arguably constitutes a form of
epistemological injustice that contributes to undermining efforts to
address material injustices (De Sousa Santos 2005; Conway 2013: xvii).
4. Secularism and global (in)justice in practice
I now briefly explore ways in which secular assumptions permeate prac-
tice-related aspects of global justice, with specific reference to human
rights, humanitarian aid and development, and forced migration, contri-
buting to epistemological injustice. As Ager and Ager (2011: 457) high-
light, secular assumptions frame public discourses of humanitarianism
leading to a marginalization and privatization of religious beliefs, prac-
tices, actors and assumptions. These assumptions include a privileging
of the rational and the material over the emotional and the spiritual
regarding what needs and perspectives are prioritized. Further, they
suggest, the dominance of secularism privileges certain (neo-)liberal mate-
rialist assumptions (Ager and Ager 2011: 457).
Two interviewees referred independently to this marginalization of the
religious and the spiritual during our fieldwork in Malawi. A community
leader from one of the villages spoke of the importance of spirituality: ‘In
our life there are several areas we need, one of them is spiritual, without
4‘Radicalization’ is the dominant term used to describe such groups, however this label should, I suggest,
be viewed critically. ‘Radical’ can refer to any number of different organizations and approaches from
‘radical’ peace activists, to ‘radical’ environmentalists, as well as ‘radical’ terrorist groups.
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that we cannot make it.’ A local program manager working in the same
area with World Vision Malawi voiced a similar observation: ‘As
human beings we are soul, spirit and body, but we [development
workers and the government] forget the spiritual and the soul. The spiri-
tual influences how you think and act.’5 Such a statement from an
employee of a faith-based development agency is revealing. It highlights
how much the development sector privileges the secular, to the point
that faith-based agencies themselves are to an extent complicit in privile-
ging secular perspectives over religious ones. Religion becomes instru-
mentalized, a means to an end, rather than part of the fabric of a
community.
This instrumentalization of religion is arguably representative of a
deeper entanglement between secular and neoliberal worldviews. As
Cecelia Lynch (2011) and Michael Barnet and Janice Gross Stein (2012)
have highlighted, in the contemporary humanitarian sector, identities
and practices of NGOs, secular and religious, are shaped to a large
degree by (neo)liberal market policies and practices. Indeed, Hopgood
and Vinjamuri (2012: 39) argue that faith-based organizations (FBOs)
and non-government organizations (NGOs) in the humanitarian aid
sector are best understood as firms operating in a market context. As
states increasingly outsource their services to private contractors and
civil society organizations, these actors are required to conform to specific
sets of market-based criteria in order to access funding support, as well as
catering their programs to the desires of the state, thereby becoming part
of the governance mechanisms orchestrated by states and intergovern-
mental organizations (Lynch 2011: 213–4). ‘Organizations are increas-
ingly rationalized, bureaucratized, and professionalized, that is, they are
introducing modern secular operating practices’ (Barnet and Stein 2012:
24). Yet, these processes can intrude on spirituality and are viewed by
some faith-based humanitarian actors with suspicion as secularization
by other means (Ngo 2015). While Barnet and Stein (2012: 24f.) suggest
that organizations may adopt secularization as a strategy, giving the
example of Islamic Relief following the events of 9/11, the question
5It is important to note that, just as multiple interpretations and meanings are applied to the term ‘reli-
gion’ and these can only be studied and properly analyzed in context, the same is true for concepts of
‘prayer’, ‘soul’ and ‘spirituality’. Black, feminist and liberation theologies have all emphasized the diver-
sity of understandings of these and other theological concepts and the need for critical self-reflexivity, as
well as appreciating that these concepts and, in the case of prayer, actions, do not mean the same thing
either within or across different religious traditions. Arguably, they do not mean the same thing from
one individual to another (e.g. Russell 1974; Smith 1991; Cone 2010).
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arises as to what extent agencies are forced to adopt secularization as a
strategy in order to survive.
Despite an increased interest in and willingness to engage with religious
actors across the humanitarian sector in recent years, this engagement has
primarily focused on the ‘added value’ that religious actors can bring to
pre-existing, predominantly secular and (Western) state-driven humani-
tarian aid and development programs (Ager and Ager 2011: 460).
Rather than generating space for religious beliefs and practices within
the predominantly secular humanitarian sector, such practices run the
risk of deepening the division between religious and secular actors and
perspectives. It contributes to a fear of instrumentalization on the part
of FBOs (Karam 2012: 10f.) and approaches that view FBOs as assets in
the pursuit of secular development goals (Karam 2012: 20) – utilizing vol-
unteer and fundraising networks that FBOs often have through their faith
communities, for example, or the influence religious leaders frequently
have in local communities, without engaging deeply, seriously and
respectfully with their core beliefs (Ager and Ager 2011: 460). Faith-
based actors are either increasingly defining themselves in secular terms
(Lynch 2011; Hopgood and Vinjamuri 2012: 38) or defining themselves
as religious communities rather than humanitarian civil society organiz-
ations to avoid having to ‘professionalize/secularize’, despite their
primary activities being the provision of humanitarian aid and relief
(Ngo 2015).
Some scholars and practitioners argue that this is a good thing, because
it reduces the possibilities for proselytizing and the exploitation of vulner-
able people by religious groups eager for converts (Hopgood and Vinja-
muri 2012: 38; Karam 2012: 10). While this is indeed a danger to be
wary of, this view fails to recognize that secular humanitarian practices,
with their awareness-raising activities, can be just as normative, biased
and exclusionary as religious ones and can in some respects be viewed
as equally exploitative (Ager and Ager 2011: 264–5). Advocating the prin-
ciple of neutrality in humanitarianism is an important part of enabling
actors to provide the aid that is desperately needed. Yet, there is a sense
in which it may be more problematic to insist on the appearance of neu-
trality, since this to some extent discourages critique of normative views
and assumptions associated with neutrality – for example, that secularism
is the best means for ensuring neutrality. Perhaps rather than neutrality, a
guiding principle for humanitarianism and for global justice more broadly
could be critical self-reflexivity, openly acknowledging and then critically
reflecting on how our own deeply held beliefs and assumptions, regardless
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of whether they emanate from religious, philosophical, political or ideo-
logical traditions, affect our ideas and actions.
Many of these tensions between secularism, neoliberalism, religion and
justice in the humanitarian sector are underpinned by similar tensions
regarding human rights more generally. The historical antagonism
between the Western secular conception of human rights and religious
approaches to these same rights and concepts of human dignity continues
to influence debates and practices today, particularly in the post-9/11
global ‘war on terror’ environment. Secular approaches tend to assume
that religions must be reformed in order to ‘fit’ with global human
rights standards enshrined in international law (Freeman 2004). This is
to a large extent because, in both contemporary human rights theory
and governance and the humanitarian sector more broadly, neutrality is
held to be one of the most important values to ensure equal treatment
and fair provision of services and, so the argument goes, only secularism
is capable of providing such neutrality. ‘A secular approach to human
rights is adequate, even necessary, in view of the world’s diversity of reli-
gious and philosophical beliefs. This assumes, however, that secularism is
neutral between these beliefs. This is precisely what some religious believ-
ers dispute’ (Freeman 2004: 385).
Approaches to human rights in theory and practice carry the implicit
assumption that secular approaches to human rights provide the neu-
trality necessary for fairly and adequately upholding and protecting
people’s rights, often against the threats to those rights posed by religious
institutions and actors. However, this does not allow for the possibility,
as Freeman (2004: 85) highlights, that ‘the appeal of religions such as
Islam may be precisely that they seem to their adherents to protect
human dignity under modern conditions, especially the modern con-
dition of Western economic, political and cultural hegemony’. This
Western hegemony includes an emphasis on secularism as the most
appropriate framework for promoting and protecting human dignity.
Yet, while some forms of secularism provide an effective way for mediat-
ing differences between religious and philosophical worldviews, in other
forms it can itself be a form of exclusion, violence and oppression
(Mavelli and Petito 2012: 931).
Moving to consider the issue of displacement and forced migration,
religion usually features in discussions of this topic in one of two
forms – either as one of the driving factors of conflict and violence
that forces people to flee and become displaced, or as one of the key
sources of assistance for refugees through FBOs that provide relief and
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support for refugees and asylum seekers in camps and in resettlement
countries (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011). This in itself highlights one of the
more pervasive implicit effects of secular assumptions – that religion
is defined as either bad or good, often depending on the extent to
which it is seen to oppose or support broader, largely secularist norms.
Casting religion’s role in only these two avenues buys into the ‘good reli-
gion, bad religion’ narrative that has become a common place of contem-
porary politics (Hurd 2012). ‘Good religion’ contributes to global
(secular) human rights standards, justice, compassion and upholding
human dignity; ‘bad religion’ creates intolerance, exclusion, violence
and chaos. Such simplistic black and white categorizations obscure
complex dynamics of power and exclusion that are embedded within
the discourses and frameworks that we use to talk about contemporary,
state-centric global politics. For example, when thinking about the needs
of displaced people, the prevailing focus is on their physical needs. Yet,
within religious worldviews, such as some versions of Islam, the spiritual
dimensions of people’s lives are as important and require as much atten-
tion as the physical. This is not to say that the protection of people’s
spiritual needs should take priority over their physical needs, but that
the two should be given equal weight (Aminu-Kano and Atallah FitzGib-
bon 2014: 12ff.).
This subordination of the spiritual to the physical is related to the
entanglements between the secular/religious divide and the public/
private divide within the humanitarian aid and development sector
more broadly. Secularism and its associated assumptions of a clear div-
ision between secular and religious and public and private is part of this
production of power imbalances that contribute to silencing alternative
(non-Western) perspectives on global problems, including migration
and economic inequality (Conway 2013: 156), and may in part contribute
to the exclusion of the perceptions and voices of displaced and margina-
lized people themselves. As such, we must be very careful about excluding
worldviews that take seriously the spiritual, metaphysical, supernatural
and transcendent, in which these dimensions of the human experience
are not partitioned off from the rest of life but are deeply embedded
and entangled with daily realities. Such exclusions devalue the ways of
thinking and being of vast sections of the global population, silencing
their voices and limiting their sources of empowerment and agency in
what must be global conversations (De Sousa Santos 2005; Ager and
Ager 2011; Conway 2013).
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5. Global justice beyond secularism?
In view of these multifarious consequences arising from the marginali-
zation of non-secular voices from theories and practices of global
justice, researchers, policy-makers and practitioners across both
secular and non-secular worldviews should explore potential alterna-
tives that can make space for these previously excluded perspectives. I
briefly consider the emerging post-secular approach that has become
influential across a number of fields as part of the critique of secularism
more generally. The work of Jürgen Habermas (2006) has been one of
the main catalysts for the engagement with post-secularism. He
argues that, to a large extent, the criteria for public reason that
govern contemporary political debate in the public sphere, including
theories and approaches to global justice, are premised on key assump-
tions of secularization theory (Habermas 2006: 2f.-). As is now well
established, however, the predictions of secularization theory have
largely not come to fruition. Religion, variously understood, is not
dying out, but is taking on new significance and alternative forms
(Casanova 1994; Hurd 2008; Beyer 2013). In this post-secular society,
Habermas (2006: 8f.) argues, we must rethink the parameters of accep-
table public reasoning and debate and in particular reassess the require-
ments that have been placed on religious citizens. A post-secular society
requires a process of mutual learning and translation for secular and
religious citizens alike and a shift to a post-metaphysical approach
that, for Habermas, does not make normative judgements on religious
truth claims but nonetheless distinguishes between faith and knowl-
edge. Such a shift in public reasoning has significant implications for
global justice theory and practice.
Yet, as many scholars have noted, Habermas’ engagement with the
post-secular is still largely done through a secularist lens. His solution
to the inequality of public debate is that instead of asking religious citizens
to translate their arguments into secular language, both religious and
secular citizens must translate their public arguments into a language
that is universal and acceptable to all. Yet, this language remains that of
secular reason (Mavelli and Petito 2012: 936; Pabst 2012: 1003f.; Birn-
baum 2015). While aiming to rehabilitate religion in the public sphere,
Habermas’ proposal is still very much embedded in and confined by the
terms of the secular. In contrast, Mavelli and Petito (2012) have articu-
lated the post-secular, not as a description of present societal conditions,
but as
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a form of radical theorizing and critique prompted by the idea that values such
as democracy, freedom, equality, inclusion, and justice may not necessarily be
best pursued within an exclusively immanent secular framework. Quite the
opposite, the secular may well be a potential site of isolation, domination, vio-
lence, and exclusion. (Mavelli and Petito 2012: 931)
The post-secular critique destabilizes categories of ‘religious’ and ‘secular,
‘public’ and ‘private’, ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’, emphasizing that such cat-
egories are largely historically, socially and culturally constructed (Breth-
erton 2010a: 15). The emergence of the post-secular critique represents
part of a shift in sensibilities away from secular assumptions about what
is rational and acceptable public reason, indeed, that the distinctions
between public and private reason are themselves products of secular
ideology and that such neat, clean divisions do not exist in reality.
Yet to date, the post-secular critique and the recognition of the partial
and subjective nature of secularism remain largely confined to academia
and are yet to permeate policy and practice. Indeed, arguably this recog-
nition remains confined to a niche area of scholarship on religion, politics
and public life. Further, while I am sympathetic and indebted to the post-
secular critique, I am unconvinced of its utility as an alternative to secu-
larism. As the critiques of the Habermasian approach suggest, the post-
secular is still in many ways too deeply entrenched in secular modes of
thinking to enable it to go beyond critique. Similar to decolonial critiques
of modernism and post-modernism (Dussel 2012: 37),6 post-secularism to
some extent remains a provincial or internal critique of a phenomenon
that developed initially in the European context. In order to develop
more radical versions of post-secularism, it is necessary to consult external
non-European critiques of the secular. Further, like all ‘post’ iterations,
post-secularism carries with it the implicit suggestion of a chronological
progression from secularism to that which comes ‘after secularism’, as
though we can clearly move from one historical age (the secular) to
another (the post-secular) (Conway 2013). The post-secular turn is an
important step along the way towards alternative frameworks for thinking
about how questions of the transcendent, the spiritual and the metaphys-
ical are entangled with and impact on various different aspects of human
existence in the contemporary age. However, its contribution may be
limited to critique, not necessarily to transformation.
There are other possible alternatives that could be considered, such as
William Connolly’s (2005) multidimensional pluralism, or relational
6I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting Dussel’s work.
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 545
dialogism (Wilson 2010, 2012). The philosophy of liberation, pioneered by
Leopoldo Zea, Augusto Salazar Bondy and decolonial thinkers such as
Enrique Dussel (1985, 1996, 2012), as a direct challenge to the assump-
tions of modernity that plague much of Habermas’ work, offers perhaps
the most promising avenue for developing alternatives to secular world-
views because it is external to the Euro-American secular context.
Indeed, their efforts to move beyond the modernist and post-modernist
frameworks, resulting in trans-modernity, may provide a model for sur-
passing the secularist paradigm (Dussel 2012: 41).
Perhaps, however, before we begin exploring alternatives, it is also
important to understand more fully the impacts of secular assumptions
on specific issues related to global justice and on the daily lived experi-
ences of people around the world. Additional research is required into
exactly how secular assumptions about religion affect the lives of displaced
persons in refugee camps; families and communities working with both
secular and religious development agencies; programs and policies addres-
sing gender inequality and gender-based violence; and efforts to promote
action on climate change and mobilize resistance to neoliberalism. The full
extent of the impact of secular assumptions on the foreign and develop-
ment policies of European states and NGOs that often fund and
implement initiatives aimed at addressing global injustices has also to
date not been extensively theorized. Fully appreciating the ways in
which certain forms of secularism exclude and marginalize people at the
levels of policy, practice and daily life will contribute to the reform of
global justice institutions, theories and practices and the development of
alternative approaches. It must also be acknowledged that the issues and
concepts I have discussed here – the public sphere, the nation-state,
global civil society, justice, displacement, development – are concepts
and problems defined by, arguably even created by, the Euro-American
secular worldview. Other perspectives will not see the world in terms of
these categories or problems, not to mention simply having different pri-
orities for what the main crises and challenges are (De Sousa Santos 2005).
In any global justice agenda, these kinds of differences must be acknowl-
edged and given space in order to prevent global epistemological injustices
from undermining the pursuit of global social justice.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Brenda Bartelink, Roland Bleiker, Gladys Ganiel, Luca Mavelli,
Sally Nelson, two anonymous reviewers and the attendees at the 2014 European
546 E. K. WILSON
Sociological Association Sociology of Religion Network Conference in Belfast, whose
questions and comments assisted him to refine the arguments presented in this article.
All errors remain his own.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Erin K. Wilson is Director of the Centre for Religion, Conflict and the Public Domain,
Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Groningen. Her research
explores ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ dynamics in global justice, human rights, migration,
gender and development. Her publications include After Secularism (2012), and The
Refugee Crisis and Religion (2016, co-edited with Luca Mavelli), and articles in Inter-
national Studies Quarterly, Journal of Refugee Studies, Politics Religion Ideology and
Global Society.
References
Ager, A. and Ager, J. (2011) ‘Faith and the discourse of secular Humanitarianism’,
Journal of Refugee Studies 24(3): 456–72.
Aminu-Kano, M. and FitzGibbon, A. (2014) An Islamic perspective on human devel-
opment. Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, http://policy.islamic-relief.
com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Human-Development-in-Islam.pdf
Appleby, S. (2000) The Ambivalence of the Sacred, Lanham, MI: Rowman and
Littlefield.
Asad, T. (2002) ‘The construction of religion as an anthropological category’, in M.
Lambek (ed.), A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion, London: Blackwell,
pp. 114–32.
Asad, T. (2003) Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Barnet, M. and Gross Stein, J. (2012) ‘Introduction’, in M. Barnet and J. Gross Stein
(eds), Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 3–36.
Bartelink, B., and Wilson, E. (2014) ‘We must all be allowed to love each other with
honour: Spirituality and social transformation’, Open Democracy, https://www.
opendemocracy.net/transformation/brenda-bartelink-erin-wilson/we-must-all-be-
allowed-to-love-each-other-with-honour-sp
Beaumont, J. and Cloke, P. (2010) ‘Introduction’, in J. Beaumont, P. Cloke and J.
Vranken (eds), Faith-based Organisations and Exclusion in European Cities,
Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 1–34.
Beitz, C. R. (2010) ‘Justice and international Relations’, in G. W. Brown and D. Held
(eds), The Cosmopolitanism Reader, London: Polity Press, pp. 85–99.
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 547
Bello, W. (1999) Dark Victory: The United States, Structural Adjustment and Global
Poverty, London: Pluto Press.
Bennett, Karen. (2007). ‘Epistemicide! The tale of a predatory discourse’, The
Translator 13(2): 151–69.
Beyer, P. (2013) ‘Questioning the secular/religious divide in a post-westphalian
world’, International Sociology 28(6): 663–79.
Birnbaum, Maria. (2015) ‘Exclusive pluralism: the problems of habermas’ postsecular
argument and the “making of” religion’, in Trevor Stack, Noami Goldenberg and
Timothy Fitzgerald (eds), Religion as a Category of Governance and Sovereignty,
Leiden: Brill, pp. 182–96.
Bretherton, L. (2010a) Christianity and Contemporary Politics, London: Wiley-
Blackwell.
Bretherton. L. (2010b) ‘Religion and the salvation of urban politics: beyond cooption,
competition and Commodification’, in A. L. Molendijk, C. Jedan and J. Beaumont
(eds), Exploring the Postsecular, Leiden: Brill, pp. 207–22.
Brink, P. A. (2003) ‘Debating international human rights: the “middle ground” for
religious participants’, Faith and International Affairs 1(2): 13–20.
Caney, S. (2011) ‘Humanity, associations, and global justice: in defence of humanity-
centered cosmopolitan egalitarianism’, The Monist 94(4): 506–34.
Casanova, Jose. (1994). Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago, IL: Chicago
University Press.
Casanova, Jose. (2011) ‘The secular, secularizations, secularisms’, in Craig Calhoun,
Mark Juergensmeyer and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (eds), Rethinking Secularism,
New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 54–74.
Cloke, P. (2010) ‘Theo-ethics and radical faith-based praxis in the postsecular City’, in
A. L. Molendijk, C. Jedan and J. Beaumont (eds), Exploring the Postsecular: The
Religious, the Political and the Urban, Leiden: Brill, pp. 223–42.
Cone, J. H. (2010) A Black Theology of Liberation – 40th Anniversary Edition,
Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
Connolly, W. (2005) Pluralism, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Conway, J. M. (2013) Edges of Global Justice: The World Social Forum and Its ‘Others’,
London: Routledge.
De Sousa Santos, B. (2005) ‘General introduction: reinventing social emancipation:
Toward new manifestos’, in B. De Sousa Santos (ed.), Democratizing Democracy:
Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon, London: Verso, pp. xvii–xxxiii.
During, S. (2010) ‘Completing secularism: the mundane in the neoliberal age’, In M.
Warner, J. VanAntwerpen and C. Calhoun (eds), Varieties of Secularism in a
Secular Age, Harvard: Harvard University Press, pp. 105–25.
Dussel, E. (1985) The Philosophy of Liberation, New York: Orbis Books.
Dussel, E. (1996) The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor and the
Philosophy of Liberation, New York: Humanities Press.
Dussel, E. (2012) ‘Transmodernity and interculturality: An interpretation from the
perspective of philosophy of liberation’, Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral
Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 1(3): 28–59.
Eberle, C. (2002) Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
548 E. K. WILSON
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2011) ‘Introduction: Faith-based humanitarianism in contexts
of forced migration’, Journal of Refugee Studies 24(3): 429–39.
Fraser, N. (2006) ‘Transnationalizing the public sphere’, Yale University, http://eipcp.
net/transversal/0605/fraser/en
Freeman, M. (2004) ‘The problem of secularism in human rights theory’, Human
Rights Quarterly 26(2): 375–400.
George, S. (2004) Another World is Possible If… , London: Verso.
Gutkowski, S. (2014) Secular War: Myths of Religion, Politics and Violence, London:
I.B. Tauris.
Habermas, J. (2006) ‘Religion in the public sphere’. European Journal of Philosophy 14
(1): 1–25.
Hopgood, S. and Vinjamuri, L. (2012) ‘Faith in markets’, in M. Barnet, and J. Gross
Stein (eds), Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 37–64.
Hurd, E. S. (2008) The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Hurd, E. S. (2012) ‘International politics after secularism’, Review of International
Studies 38(5): 943–61.
Johnston, D. and Sampson, C. (eds). (1994) Religion: The Missing Dimension in
Statecraft, New York: Oxford University Press.
Karam, A. (2012) Religion, Development and the United Nations. Social Science
Research Council Report, New York: Social Science Research Council, http://
www.ssrc.org/publications/view/religion-development-and-the-united-nations/
Kmiec, D. (2015) ‘Secularism crucified?’, in J. R. Adler and L. Gary (eds), Secularism,
Catholicism, and the Future of Public Life: A Dialogue with Ambassador Douglas
W. Kmiec, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21–122.
Kuru, A. T. (2007) ‘Passive and assertive secularism: historical conditions, ideological
struggles, and state policies toward religion’, World Politics 59(4): 568–94.
Lloyd, V. W., and Viefhues Bailey, L. 2015. ‘Introduction: Is the postcolonial postse-
cular?’, Critical Research on Religion 3(1): 13–24.
Lynch, C. (2011) ‘Religious humanitarianism and the global politics of secularism’, in
C. Calhoun, M. Juergensmeyer and J. VanAntwerpen (eds), Rethinking Secularism,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 204–24.
Mavelli, L. (2012) Europe’s Encounter with Islam: The Secular and the Postsecular,
London: Routledge.
Mavelli, L. and Petito, F. (2012) ‘The postsecular in international politics: An over-
view’, Review of International Studies, 38(5): 936.
Mueller, J. L. (2011) ‘The IMF, neoliberalism and hegemony’, Global Society 25(3):
377–402.
Ngo, M. (2015) ‘Religious space, transnational space, humanitarian space: case study
of a faith-based organisation on the African Migration route’, Unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Swinburne University, Melbourne, Australia.
O’Neill, O. (2010) ‘Rights, obligations, priorities’, Studies in Christian Ethics 23(2):
163–71.
Pabst, A. (2012) ‘The secularism of post-secularity: Religion, realism and the revival of
grand theory in IR’, Review of International Studies 38(5): 995–1017.
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 549
Parliament of the World’s Religions. (2006) A Global Ethic: The Declaration of the
Parliament of the World’s Religions, New York: Continuum.
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. (2012) The Global Religious Landscape: A
Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Major Religious Groups as of
2010, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, http://www.pewforum.org/files/
2014/01/global-religion-full.pdf
Pogge, T. (2010) Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric,
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Prokhovnik, R. (2003) Rational Woman: A Feminist Critique of Dichotomy,
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Rawls, J. (1988) ‘The priority of right and ideas of the good’, Philosophy and Public
Affairs 17(4): 251–76.
Russell, L. M. (1974) Human Liberation in a Feminist Perspective – a Theology,
Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press.
Sassen, S. (2003) ‘Globalization or denationalization?’, Review of International
Political Economy 10(1): 1–22.
Sen, A. (2010) The Idea of Justice, London: Penguin.
Singer, P. (2010) The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty, London:
Pan Macmillan.
Smith, C. (1991) The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social
Movement Theory, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Steger, M. B. (2008) The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the
French Revolution to the War on Terror, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Steger, M. B., Goodman, J., and Wilson, E. K. (2013) Justice Globalism: Ideology,
Crises, Policy, London: Sage.
Tarrow, S. (2005) The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Taylor, C. (2009) ‘The polysemy of the Secular’, Social Research 76(4): 1143–66.
Wilson, E. K. (2010) ‘Beyond dualism: Expanded understandings of religion and
global justice’, International Studies Quarterly 54(3): 733–54.
Wilson, E. K. (2012) After Secularism: Rethinking Religion in Global Politics,
Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Wilson, E. K. (2014) ‘Justice globalism’, in M. B. Steger, J. Siracusa, and P. Battersby
(eds), The Sage Handbook of Globalization, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 39–54.
Wilson, E. K., Steger, M. B. (2013) ‘Religious globalisms in a postsecular age’,
Globalizations 10(3): 481–95.
550 E. K. WILSON
